China and Israel

I was curious about Israel’s relationship with China. All I knew was that China always voted against Israel in the U.N. I was directed to an organization called SIGNAL (Sino-Israel Global Network and Global Leadership) and its founder and executive director, Carice Witte. I asked her if she would grant me an interview, and she kindly invited me to the organization’s headquarters.

When I arrived at the address on Jabotinsky Street, I looked up at the two sleek, 14-story buildings of the Twin Towers complex, covered with reflective glass windows, located in Ramat Gan’s Diamond District. As I entered Carice’s office, I felt as if I had been transported to the Far East. It was meticulously furnished in the Chinese style.

Now I was sitting in front of Carice Witte, a most remarkable person. How many of us have dreams and passions that we have actualized no matter how long the wait and the delays that life throws at us? How many people get satisfaction from their passions in that they know they are used in the service of their people? Carice Witte is one of those people. In the following interview, I got to find out about her and learn a bit about her great knowledge of China. Here are segments of the interview.

Sam Finkel: Can you tell me a little bit about yourself?

Carice Witte: I grew up in Westchester, New York. My family moved to Westport, Connecticut, for its excellent public schools. From there I went to Yale University, where I majored in East Asian studies with a focus on China. People ask why I was interested in China in 1980 – before China became a “big” thing. As a child, we did a lot of traveling to places off the beaten path in Latin America. Perhaps that’s why I developed an interest in foreign cultures and languages, and when I was deciding my direction at Yale and my father suggested China as a focus, I said, “Why not?”

As a sophomore in college, it wasn’t as if I had an interest in my own Jewish culture. I had grown up in a non-Zionist, non-religious home. We were taught to respect being Jewish and developed a general cultural connection – fasting on Yom Kippur, not eating shellfish in the house. Israel was not really any more relevant to me than Australia or Zimbabwe. My connection to China progressed through my studies at Yale and a summer in Taiwan to strengthen my language skills. My goal was to produce documentary films on different cultures, including China.

After graduation, I went into the documentary film business in Manhattan, and in 1984, I was offered an opportunity to do a documentary in China. I had already traveled in mainland China, so went back to research for the production. I spent a good amount of time in China in 1984 and ’85, when the country was a different world from today regarding development. But the Chinese deep and abiding culture remains. The Chinese are the Chinese like the Jews are the Jews – deep tradition and culture – but we both evolve. They have evolved but within their own context. So China has all the shiny buildings and advanced technologies and great subways and the ability to build a new subway station every three months – it was amazing to return to Beijing every three months and see a new section of the subway had opened – but China remains China with strong traditions. Part of Chinese tradition is to work hard. And in modern China that hard work is focused according to central planning. China has always been a top-down culture; where there used to be an emperor there is now the Central Communist Party. There is a sense of continuity and a feel of Confucianism to the communism.

SF: Can you elaborate on that those who don’t know much about Confucianism?

CW: China is not dogmatically following Marxism; it is a Leninist state, first of all. Second of all, the ability to reinterpret Marxism and define socialism as “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which is the way it’s phrased in China, was informed by Confucian beliefs. Confucianism is based on a hierarchical framework, so the pure socialist-communist ideal that everybody is equal doesn’t really fit with Confucianism. But concept of hierarchical levels of power that include a leading central communist party, a top-level politburo, and other levels of power all working for the sake of the people did fit with Confucianism, which is also informed by a paternalistic approach to managing the social order. A defining characteristic of China and the Chinese people is that they are adaptable. Communism and socialism were adapted to suit Chinese culture. Later it adapted capitalism to suit the needs of the nation.

SF: So, it was less rigid than the Russia model.

CW: Yes, it’s more flexible and willing to adapt to the times and the changing needs of the people as interpreted by the leaders.

SF: So, you did a documentary about China.

CW: I did a documentary in China expecting it would be the first of many. After I returned, my sister had gotten married, and I visited her here in Israel. She had made aliyah, and she had a baby. When I arrived in Israel for that visit in 1985, I inexplicably had my “Hollywood epiphany – Oh my G-d, this is my home – moment.” It came completely out of nowhere, and I made a decision to make aliyah. I also decided I wanted to study Judaism and pursued it at Lincoln Square Synagogue’s beginner’s minyan.

SF: Who was the rabbi there at the time?

CW: Rabbi  Buchwald; he is still there.

SF: Oh, he’s amazing.

CF: Yes, the beginner’s minyan has a very smart approach to appeal to the Manhattan intellectual Jewish audience. It did not require mitzvot; they just said, “come, learn, and listen.” They felt that, little by little, mitzvot would come naturally, which I think in many cases it did; it certainly did for me. I became a partial chozeret b’teshuvah, meaning I became kosher, kept Shabbat and Chagim, and I fast two of the fasts. I made aliyah in 1987, and why does that matter for this story? Because in 1987 Israel did not have official relations with China. So all my China knowledge, all my China experience, and all my education were useless. I got married, started having children, started helping my husband with the family business, and stuck with the business for the next 25 years. I had nothing to do with China except in the most peripheral read-the-news way.

I lived through the First Intifada, the Gulf War, the Second Intifada – all the things that you probably also lived through. During the Second Intifada, I made a commitment to myself that, eventually, I would do something to help neutralize the delegitimization of Israel. Then in 2008, one of our businesses closed, and I was free to focus on this idea that had been with me for the past six years of finding a way to help make a positive and meaningful contribution to Israel. My kids were old enough, and I was able to invest time in developing something new.

SF: What did you do?

CW: In 2009, the process led me to some out-of-the-box thinking. I saw that Israel and China both survived the subprime crash very well, and they were sort of noticing each other, but nothing seemed to be happening. My assessment was that China had done great business with America, and Israel had done great business with America, but China and Israel didn’t do any great business with each other, because they are both like this [Carice closes her hands in a tight fist to illustrate], and America is like this [opens her palms].

Neither China nor Israel wanted to put money on the table. Both are tough to do business with, and so when you work with Americans, where they put up the money, America makes money and you make money, and everyone wins. But these two tightfisted countries didn’t know anything about each other. They had had little or no contact with each other since the Phalcon and Harpy Crisis of 2000. There was no business, no academic exchange, no tourism. I looked to fill the relevancy gap between Israel and China and to help enhance Israel’s relations with China by establishing the field of Israel studies in Chinese universities. My research showed that, in 5,000 years, there had never been a single course on Israel in China! We have Asia studies with a Chinese focus in Israel, but there was nothing on Israel in China except about 36 students every four years in three different universities who studied Hebrew. The lack of Israel studies made sense because Israel was basically persona non grata in China since the Chinese joined the non-alignment movement and Muslim boycott in 1955. In general, the perspective of the Muslim states was not to associate with Israel, and that was respected by China.

SF: What were the Phalcon and Harpy crises?

CW: Before the Berlin Wall fell, when Washington wanted to entice China away from USSR, Israel was given a green light by the U.S. to sell Beijing defense equipment. In fact, we had been unofficially selling defense equipment to China before we had official relations through Shaul Eisenberg, an international businessman. But when Israel and China formalized our relations in 1992, sales of defense equipment became official. That is one of the reasons that Jiang Zemin, the president of China, came to Israel – the only time in the history of our two countries that a president of China came to Israel. We were also cooperating to some extent on intelligence sharing.

Sino-Israel relations took a turn for the worse, however, when Israel, due to heavy American pressure, reneged on a major sale in 1999 of the Phalcon, a sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft that would allow the Chinese to gather intelligence at a distance. It happened again in 2004, when the U.S. forced Israel to stop the repairs and upgrades on the Harpy laser-guided drones that Israel had sold to China in 1994.

Aside from some water technology sold to China, there was no other contact. No people-to-people relations, no tourism. Perhaps it is comparable to our relations with Jordan and Egypt, where we have official relations, but they are not fully normalized. Of course, with the Chinese, it was for different reasons. In 1992, Israel’s interest in China was very limited. My guess is that Jerusalem wasn’t thinking on a broad strategic level regarding China. It was not considered that important; it was not central to Israel’s core interest: security. In 2010, when I turned to Jews of America and said I’m establishing an organization that will enhance Israel’s ties with China to contribute to Israel’s long-term stability and security, their response was “Huh? what are you talking about? There’s only one country that matters to Israel’s stability and security and that is America. And maybe to some extent, Europe. And after that you fall off the planet.”

SF: How could China impact on Israel’s security and wellbeing?

CW: There are a million Chinese working in the Middle East right now. China is investing in infrastructure, ports, communications technologies (such as 5G), and smart cities across the Middle East. Sixty percent of all of China’s trade with the Middle East goes through the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It was recently reported that China was building a military base in the UAE that was put on hold due to U.S. queries. China signed a 25-year $400-billion agreement with Iran.

SF: So, China is having increased influence in the Middle East.

CW: Yes, more and more influence and presence. China has the ability to impact regional stability if we could help them see our perspective more successfully. For Israel, it is a problem that China considers the U.S. to be the great destabilizer of the Middle East and not Iran. It is a problem that China is politically pro-Palestinian, and votes 100% of the time against Israel in the United Nations. Very few countries of substance have such a consistent voting record. Even India abstains sometimes.

SF: Why does China always vote against Israel?

CW:  One important reason is to ensure that China can count on 56 Muslim votes in the United Nations. China works hard to maintain those votes. For example, when 27 ambassadors from the EU signed a letter against what China’s doing with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China went to the Muslim states and produced 40 or so signatures on a letter supporting China’s endeavors. Those votes are very significant. China has succeeded in becoming a leader within a variety of organizations in the United Nations, giving Beijing more of a say and helping the process to reshape global governance through the work of the United Nations. Beijing generally aims to create a global framework that is more receptive to China and China’s interests.

SF: So it’s in Israel’s interests to try to get their point of view across to the Chinese.

CW: Yes. And Israel studies at the university level aims to cultivate a generation of people in China who will have a more informed understanding of Israel.

SF: What kind of activities do you have in China?

CW:  We cooperate with universities to establish courses on Israel studies, we provide lectures by Israeli professors, support and encourage annual research paper competitions on Israel studies – and we educate Chinese professors in Israel in the field of Israel studies so they can return to their universities and teach about Israel. In general, we are the only Israeli organization with programs across the country, and we are the organization with probably the widest and deepest network within China outside of the Israeli government.

SF: Have you ever met any top-ranking Chinese leaders?

CW: I have a picture of me and Wang Yi, foreign minister and state counselor. But I have worked with many generals and high-ranking party officials.

SF: Are they surprised by what they learn about Israel?

CW: They’re impressed. Always impressed.

SF: What are they most impressed with?

CW: With the historic success of the Jewish people, how against all odds the Jews have thrived. How with endless oppression, anti-Semitism, and abuse, we have thrived. They will tell you exactly how many Nobel prizes we have won as Jews, and want to know why and how.

SF: Like the South Koreans?

CW: Yes. More so, probably. So that’s the general Jewish thing. And then about Israel, how a beleaguered, tiny state that is criticized, attacked, and sanctioned in the United Nations over and over and over thrives. How it is so successful. But the U.S. has always been a factor. Take the example of the Haifa port. Obama had given the okay through Ambassador Shapira that the mayor of Haifa, Yonah Yahav, could ask his friend in Shanghai to find a company to bid on the new private port. No American company was interested. They said it was too small a project and not profitable enough. And so the Shanghai mayor brought in the Shanghai International Port Group.

SF: Mike Pompeo came to Israel and strongly urged them not to allow China to build a desalination plant at Nachal Sorek, which is near an Israeli air force base. He said there were major security issues. Do you agree with that?

CW: I think it was a perception issue. I am not a security expert; I am not qualified to do a security assessment, but I will tell you a few things: Number one, Li Ka-shing, Chairman of the Board and the senior advisor for CK Hutchison Holdings, the guy who “bought” the “Technion”[1] branch in China – his company has a number of subsidiaries now in Israel and they’ve done a lot of business here. IDE, the Israeli desalination company[2] and a Hutchison subsidiary (Hutchison Water) are jointly working on the Sorek 1 desalination plant. There was a tender (bid) for Sorek 2 – the two split. Why? I don’t know. My view is that both companies are equally skilled. Israel should have won it on merit, unless China said they would do it much cheaper. I was told that the Israelis won it fair and square, and I am happy to believe that.

I think that Pompeo got involved because it was too reminiscent of the Haifa port – an Israeli infrastructure run by a Chinese company, which is right next to an American military installation, with Americans who go there[3]. The optics were terrible. I would also say that the reason it was a problem for Israel is because Israel was not adept in Chinese matters. I would really appreciate if you would write about this because, to me, this is the core issue: China is Confucian, Daoist, Buddhist, atheist, Communist – not Judeo-Christian. The Chinese have a totally different history from ours. The Jews, Christians, and Muslims – the Western world –  have a lot of crossovers culturally.

SF: What are the main differences that might baffle people of the West about Chinese values and Chinese perspectives?

CW: Chinese values are based on their unique history that’s thousands of years old, where there was a central leader. They are impacted by centuries of poverty and hunger for most of the country until 40 years ago. That shapes your values. In early 2021, Beijing declared the end of extreme poverty. For China, the most important thing is that the people have food, a job, education for their children, Confucian values, such as filial piety, respect for your parents, honoring your ancestors and your country (nationalism has grown over the past few years), and hope for the future. Those are the values.[4]

SF: People are scared of China. More than three-and-a-half million people died from COVID, at the very least, due to negligence on the Chinese part. China knew months earlier what was going on and kept quiet, and they let people in and out of the country. Now, we spoke earlier about Western values in comparison to Chinese values. The West has a feeling of responsibility for others, but what is going on with the Chinese?

CW: Values are a factor. When Xi Jinping was being criticized regarding Xinjiang[5] at a conference with Europeans, he turned to them and said that anti-Semitism is so rife in Europe that Jews want to leave – and he quoted statistics. But a significant contributor to fears regarding China is the fear of the unknown. The world knows the U.S.A. It is familiar with 70 years of U.S. hegemony. We all know how the U.S. conducts its affairs. There are problems with some of what the U.S. does. Not everybody likes it. Some people hate it. But it’s familiar. Prior to that, you had colonial Britain, Portugal, and Spain. Nobody in the history of the planet, including the Chinese, has any idea what the world would look like if the Chinese were the superpower or were in a position where there was no counterpoint.

Fear is perhaps also propagated by what goes on in domestic China[6] – how China was able to rein in the virus with aggressive tools that aren’t allowed in Western democracies. Unlike in China, the West has a very active, vocal media. Even though Western media are sometimes biased, and not every voice gets out there, it’s more open than in China. Journalism, by exposing these problems, is a check on the government that does not exist in China. China sees the free Western media contributing to disrespect for authority and promoting disorder.

SF: On the other hand, China had no regret and took no responsibility over all the deaths that took place due to COVID.

CW: China does not take responsibility for what happens in other countries. In fact, they say that other countries are failing. “We succeeded, they failed. We take no responsibility for how they managed it.”

SF: How does that shape your personal feelings towards the Chinese?

CW: My view of China is that it has a rich culture that’s very different from mine. It has a different system that is not suited to Israel or the West. I would not want China to be in a position to interfere in Israel’s affairs. Nor would I want to see changes in the global order that would limit the personal freedom we enjoy in Israel and the West. At the same time, I appreciate the opportunity to study this very different culture that enables me to reflect on my own – in order to make my own environment better.

Back in 2010, when I was in China and China became the world’s second largest economy and declared they would become innovators, I said to myself that I am on the right track regarding China; that China’s development and interests would bring it closer to Israel. The Chinese had suffered a hundred years of humiliation, and they are going to become more confident because China became the second largest economy, and then they will be able to withstand the Muslim pressure not to have anything to with Israel. And because they aimed to become innovators, they would be motivated to come to Israel for the innovation that they couldn’t get in America.

SF: So, is China starting to soften its stance against Israel in the UN?

CW: No. During the Gaza war in May 2021, China held the rotating presidency of the Security Council at the UN. Foreign Minister Wang Yi twice tried to push through a vote to end the war before Israel had a chance to neutralize enough of the missiles being shot at its people.

SF: Tell us the difference between the Chinese and Russian dictatorships.

CW: I am really glad you asked that because I have been told that Israel sees the Chinese as similar to Russia. They are not! First of all, China was the little brother of the big Soviet Union. The wall fell, the Soviet Union broke up, China’s economy grew significantly, Russia became economically weak – and China became the big brother. Putin is a strong leader and knows how to manage the few resources he has very well, but Xi Jinping is a long-term planner and a very effective manager who has been planning the rejuvenation of the Chinese people for a long time.

SF: Is Xi Jinping more interested in the welfare of his people than Putin is in his?

CW:  I believe that Xi Jinping truly believes that he is working for the sake of the people and that he is the man who can return China to its role of global centrality. And that’s why he has arrogated so much power to himself. Xi Jinping made his own assessments and believes that he’s working for the greater good of the Chinese people.

SF: One last question, is China going to invade Taiwan?

CW: In my opinion, China will not invade Taiwan in the coming few years unless aggressive diplomatic or other steps regarding Taiwan are taken by the U.S. or a strong midsized country such as the UK, France, or Germany.

Sam Finkel, formerly from Baltimore, has lived in Israel since 2002. His book, Rebels in the Holy Land, Mazkeret Batya – an Early Battleground for the Soul of Israel, which also deals with the shmitah controversy of 1889, has recently been translated into Hebrew under the title Giborei Ko’ach Nishkachim. The views and sentiments expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the author.