Israel on the Middle East Chessboard : Will There Be War?


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Since Pesach, a flurry of unforeseen events has stricken the Middle East. Iran is days away from producing a nuclear bomb and has at the same time incited its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies into stepping up attacks from Lebanon. Meanwhile, Israel is at work cementing regional alliances with Central Asian Shiite countries and Sunni countries neighboring Iran – even with even close-by Arab ones. This in preparation, perhaps, for an attack aimed at denying Iran a nuclear weapon and ending the clerical regime long devoted to destroying the Jewish state.

Indeed, according to both Israeli and American intelligence experts an Israel-Iran war is now imminent. Given Israel’s current internal strife, however, and the conflicting religious, ideological, and strategic interests of these alliances, as well as the interests of the superpowers, what can we expect should a war come to pass? Let’s review recent events and then consider how such a war might play out.

Shifting Allies

Just before Pesach, a Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iran reconciliation made headlines as the foreign ministers of the two Moslem rivals announced a restoration of relations and the imminent state visit of the Saudi king to Iran. The reconciliation surprised the world because just last November the two Islamic adversaries nearly went to war as the Saudis were cozying up to Israel, even allowing the media to expose a secret visit by the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Saudi-Iranian rivalry continued heating up into this year, with Iran accelerating its nuclear bomb-making capacity and continuing proxy warfare in Yemen between the Iranian-backed Shiite-led government and Saudi-backed rebels. Although Iraqi, Omani, and Qatari mediators tried to cool the hostilities between Saudia Arabia (which leads the world’s Sunni Moslems) and Iran (which leads the world’s Shiite Moslems) it was to no avail. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and the Corona virus crisis brought the ostracized world outlaws, Russia and China, into an alliance with Iran, as the U.S., under President Biden, hibernated.

While Saudi Arabia and Iran reconcile, Israel is cementing its likely allies, especially with those countries neighboring Iran. Azerbaijan just announced the opening of an embassy in Tel Aviv, which had been long postponed out of deference to its fellow-Shiite neighbor Iran. Now, however, the Azeris were angry at Iran for subtly backing Christian Armenia in the recent Azeri-Armenian war in 2020. (Iran accuses Azerbaijan of fomenting revolt within Iran’s own Azerbaijan province, where Turkic Azeris comprise 40% of Iran’s population.) Israel became an Azeri hero for providing the advanced weaponry necessary for Azeri battlefield success. Last week, Israeli Foreign Minister Cohen visited Azerbaijan, and then Turkmenistan, to open a formal Israel embassy just 15 miles from the Iranian border.

Prime Minister Netanyahu, speaking to the U.S. media, downplayed the Saudi-Iran reconciliation and noted that the Saudis know who their true friends are in the region. He suggested that the recent visits by PLO Authority and Hamas leadership to Saudi Arabia may have been to dissuade them against further attacks.

Internal Dynamics

How will Israel’s internal strife affect the Israel-Iran war-in-the-making? International theorists have long argued whether a country’s internal stability or instability provokes war. A stable country without strife is more unified to carry out an attack, while an unstable country might seek to rally and unify its disgruntled divisive masses around a banner of national defense.  In the case of Iran, its multi-ethnic makeup and its recent protests against the clerical dictatorship, combined with Western sanctions, makes Iran very unstable. A growing younger generation of disaffected Iranians has been alienated by the Iranian theocracy of aging ayatollahs, including the mass murderer, Ayatollah Raisi. They began mass protests last fall over a Kurdish woman dying in custody of the regime’s religious police for not wearing a head covering. The protests demonstrated total disillusionment with the clerical regime, with the crowds’ chants professing honor to the former Pahlavi monarchy rattled Islamic Republic leaders.

The regime also faces dissent in the potential break-away ethnic provinces Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, and especially Baluchistan, where Sunni Islamists are in open rebellion. With divided opposition abroad, the Pahlavis have made a comeback. Last week, Israel embraced the former Shah of Iran’s son as he visited Yerushalayim’s Kotel and recent Arab terrorist victims from Judea and Samaria, promising to restore his father’s Iran-Israel friendship under a future “Cyrus accords.”

Israel is not immune to dissent that could affect a war. But, beleaguered as it is in a sea of hostile Arabs, especially radical Islamized attackers, Israel is less susceptible to disunity in war. Nonetheless, demographic changes led to the election of a more Torah-abiding coalition government under Prime Minister Netanyahu – making obvious the waning of the old secular socialist guard – which has provoked the recent anti-government protests, including calls to boycott the security forces.

The Arab Wild Card

The repressive countries of Russia, China, Syria, and Iran are emerging as close allies, and they naturally line up with Iran against U.S.-backed Israel. The tricky piece is the unpredictable Arab lineup because of the opposing goals of the Abraham Accords and the Iran-Saudi reconciliation. Netanyahu may be right, though, to downplay that reconciliation, given the long, historic Sunni-Shiite religious divide, fought in numerous “Sushi” (Sunni-Shiite) wars since Islam’s birth.

Other motives could be at work. Saudi Arabia may have suspended its hostility to Iran to smother a lurking Shiite revolt in its Eastern oil-rich provinces, where the repressed Shiite populace is exploding. In 2016, the Saudis’ beheading of a rebellious, Iranian-trained, Saudi Shiite cleric resulted in Iranians storming the Saudi Tehran embassy and a break in relations. Iran may have also buried its hostility to Saudi Arabia to quell Sunni Islamicists in Baluchistan. 

Despite a new young Saudi crown prince flirting with Israel, including opening its airspace for Israeli civilian air traffic, Saudi behavior is unpredictable. Factors weighing against Israel are a truce in Yemen as well as the likelihood of Assad-ruled Syria being welcomed back into the Arab League. (Syria was suspended from the Sunni-dominated Arab League during the Syrian civil war, when Sunni Islamists succeeded in nearly defeating the Alawite Assad regime before Russia entered the war. The Alawites are an offshoot of Shiite Islam.)

The Saudis refused to enter the Abraham Accords in contrast to many of their fellow Arabs, especially Saudi-allied United Arab Emirates (UAR) and Bahrain. Neighboring Qatar and Oman have dealt with Israel as Qatar serves as a Hamas mediator, and Oman just granted permission for Israeli civilian aircraft to fly over its airspace. Oman still refuses to enter the Abraham Accords despite offering to mediate with Iran and granting Netanyahu an official visit a few years ago. If war should break out, Israel can hope that the Saudis will step aside should Israel use its UAE and Bahrain allies in an attack on Iran. These Saudi allies, who are emerging as close friends of Israel, may pressure the Saudis not to react beyond verbal protest. 

Alternatively, out of deference to Iran, the Saudis, with their allies, may refuse to assist Israel altogether in the name of Islamic solidarity. The UAR has played both sides, actively participating against Israel at the UN to uphold the Jordanian Arab hegemony outlawing Jewish worship at Har Habayis, while also having its emir telephone Netanyahu to express Passover greetings to the Jewish people. (Minus the korban Pesach!). While the U.S. shunned Israeli coalition government officials Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir because of their support for Jewish access to the Temple Mount and Judea and their Samaria annexation views, the UAE hosted them as guests of honor at their National Day event in their Tel Aviv UAR embassy last fall. 

The Superpowers

Superpowers will be constrained in their active support for either Iran or Israel. Russia is bogged down in a war in Ukraine, which it has failed to swiftly swallow as the world, including Israel, voices sympathy for Ukrainian leader Zelensky, a Jew. Russia has had to call upon its allies – Syria for soldiers and Iran for shoddy drone weaponry. It still controls Syrian skies after turning around the country’s civil war in favor of Assad. Nonetheless, Russia has been helpless to stop daily Israeli attacks against Syrian military infrastructure, which is hosting Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah.

China makes for an odd bedfellow with Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. China has had a long historical rivalry with Russia, and it has harshly repressed its Moslem populace, especially the Uyghurs, who seek a breakaway state. The aging communist party-ruled economic power has drawn U.S. rebuke and sanction because of its negligence regarding the Corona virus as well as its military exercises in the Pacific Rim, which threaten democratic allies of the U.S. 

The differences among these allies could get temporarily put aside should an Israel-Iran war spark a larger world war. Political drama will tend to hide who is on which side, just as, shortly before World War I, the Kaiser of Germany hosted his first cousin, Czar Nicolas of Russia. They posed for the photographer wearing the exchanged military uniforms of their adversarial empires and yet were shortly thereafter embroiled in war. Before World War II, too, the Soviet-German 1939 non-aggression pact fooled war strategists. The 1941 Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union violated the pact, proving that enmity may be temporarily set aside for strategic goals, only to quickly reignite.

Like Iran, China suffers from an aging leadership, and its communist ideology alienates a populous younger generation, which has been harmed by Western economic sanctions. China’s recent offer to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict is a non-starter, given its insistence on land for peace and the creation of a so-called Palestinian state on all Israel’s pre-1967 borders. Even the Abraham Accords professes a realistic solution, which denies the outright expulsion of over half-million Jews in Judea and Samaria.

The U.S. will likely have to stand behind Israel, given Iran’s aggressive behavior toward producing a nuclear bomb; its threats to close the Strait of Hormoz, through which substantial oil traffic passes; and its repression of recent protests. The Biden administration’s attempt to woo Iran back into nuclear negotiations has admittedly failed. Biden faces an upcoming election, in which Republican opponents are openly criticizing his failure to embrace Israel enough. The U.S. certainly does not want to see a Soviet-and-Chinese-backed Iran going nuclear or creating a further energy crisis with its subversive activities in the Persian Gulf.

The War to Be

How could open war be sparked? The most likely scenario is a surprise Israeli attack on Iran’s underground nuclear sites before an Iranian bomb comes into being. The attack would hopefully knock out Iran’s nuclear potential. This would be followed by an attempt to use Israel’s agents, who are well-penetrated within the regime, to help foment internal unrest aimed at a counterrevolution in favor of a Pahlavi-led, democratic-minded, younger generation. The attack would probably be launched from neighboring allies and/or the Persian Gulf. As with Hamas’ Gaza tunnels, the attack would have to be lethal enough to knock out deep underground installations. Fomenting internal strife to overthrow the regime is trickier as the Raisi regime’s fierce repression of protesters with mass executions, according to the UN, has muzzled dissent.  Raisi is a mass murderer who, as one of Iran’s chief judges, put to death tens of thousands of alleged Iranian dissenters following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Imitating Czarist Russia, harsh repression does curtail dissent in the short term, while war and forced relaxation of suppression, which Czar Nicolas provided in the aftermath of the 1905 Japan-Russian War, unleashed eventual revolution. Israel’s likely allies within Iran, the ethnically alienated Azeris and Kurds, might mobilize for resistance. If Israel’s allies can establish a “Free Iran” territory with a counter-government, they may be able to inspire further dissent to bring down the Islamic Republic.

But Iran also has an attack strategy, which it just began. It provokes Hezbollah, and now Hamas terrorists, to launch attacks into northern Israel from Lebanon, as a second front beyond Gaza. Israeli air strikes over Syria have so far frustrated Iranian efforts to establish a strong front for attack. Hezbollah and Hamas attacks may force Israel into attacking and/or securing territory in Lebanon. And it could assist anti-Assad rebels left over from a waning civil war to reignite rebellion against the Syrian regime. While in the past, Soviet intervention against Israel was feared, the Ukrainian war curtails the possibility of large-scale Russian intervention. Arab insurrection is also likely, especially in Judea and Samaria, where there is already an uptick of attacks against Jews. Considering that the likelihood of war increases with Iran’s near nuclear bomb-making capacity, Hamas’ entry into Lebanon to join its Hezbollah hosts, and apparent Sunni-Shiite reconciliation, will Israel be able to withstand enemies? As we go from marking Pesach miracles, we daven for and await not only Hashem’s protection but the true redemption of Israel with the ushering in of the final geulah and binyan Beis Hamikdash, bimheirah biyameinu. Amen.

 

The author is a U.S. Foreign Service veteran. As Middle East Professor at Community College Baltimore County (CCBC), he developed and taught the course “The U.S. and the Middle East.” He now serves as Shoel U’Mesheiv at Yeshiva Toras Chaim in North Miami Beach, Florida.

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