Synopsis
With the close of War II, 250,000 Jews languished in
DP camps in Europe. In Palestine, turmoil reigned as British struggled to
maintain order between Jews and Arabs even as they prevented Jews from entering
the country. President Roosevelt promised the Arab Ibn Saud that the U.S. would
not support a Jewish state, and the State Department was adamantly opposed to
one. This was the gloomy picture in 1945. Then, in April of that year,
Roosevelt suddenly died, and Harry Truman took his place.
Bible-believing Truman was sympathetic to a Jewish
state, but not persuaded. He was worried about Arab oil, and he had legitimate
fears of provoking a broader war in the Middle East. Plus, he was thoroughly
alienated by “pushy New York Jews” and refused to meet any more Zionists.
Palestine was a powder keg, and a United Nations
committee was formed to study the problem. It proposed “partition,” the
creation of two states: Arab and Jewish. But would there be a two-thirds vote
in the UN in favor? Would the State of Israel come into being? Here is “the rest of the story.”
The Hero: Chaim Weizmann
Keep in mind that,
at this stage, the United States was still not openly supporting partition.
Truman had had it with the Zionists, especially Abba Hillel Silver, whom he
detested. I cannot overemphasize how absolutely opposed to partition the State
Department was. They kept coming up with reasons – like it could only be
enforced by troops and that these troops would be fighting the Arabs and the
Jews.
Once again there
was a committee and multiple presentations by Arabs and Jews. The last speaker
was, once again, that person whom Ben Gurion considered a has-been – an over-the-hill
old man, Chaim Weizmann. Let me give you an example of how he captivated his
audience. He decided to put in a little humor to deal with the Arabs’ argument
that the Jews were not descendants of the ancient Hebrews but came from the
Khazar tribes of southern Russia. He said, “It is strange, very strange, but
all my life I have been a Jew. I have felt like a Jew. I have suffered like a
Jew. So now it is fascinating to learn that I am a Khazar.” Then Chaim Weizmann
closed with this quote from the Tanach:
“The Lord shall set his hand the second time to recover the remnants of his
people. And He shall set up an ensign for the nations and shall assemble the
outcast of Israel and gather together the dispersed of Judah from the four
corners of the earth.”
At this time, the
State Department was agitating to remove the Negev from the proposed Jewish
section. When Weizmann was finally given an appointment with President Truman,
he was advised to stick to one topic only, inclusion of the Negev. Instead,
Weizmann didn’t talk politics; he wisely talked agriculture to a president who
was once a farmer. The chemist Weizmann told the President that Israel would
desalinate the water and make the desert bloom. They would grow carrots,
bananas, and potatoes in areas where nothing had grown for hundreds of years.
He and the President got along fine, and Truman promised to instruct the UN delegation
to include the Negev.
Meanwhile, the
State Department gave the distinct message that the United States was not
advocating for partition, even if its delegation would vote for it. Nothing was
being done to sway delegations from other countries to vote for partition. This
was very dangerous. The vote was scheduled for the next day, and there was a
good chance it would not get the two-thirds majority to support partition.
Several small countries had changed their minds and were going to vote against.
Rumors began to circulate that other countries were having second thoughts.
David Horowitz, of the Jewish Agency, noted that the Zionists looked downcast
and the Arabs looked overjoyed.
The Vote
Luckily, it was Wednesday
and the eve of Thanksgiving. The only option was to delay. The Zionists working
the corridors of the UN meeting were able to get some sympathetic nations to
push off the vote, which was rescheduled after the weekend. The biggest problem
for the pro-partition forces was the neutrality of the United States. Even
though Truman acted upset at the lobbying that he was receiving from the
Zionists, there is much evidence that he did act to promote a vote in favor of
the Jews, against the position of the State Department, which practiced a
policy of indifference.
Former
Undersecretary of State Sumner Wells, who had many contacts in the Truman Administration,
claimed that “by direct order of the White House, every form of pressure,
direct or indirect, was brought to bear by American officials.” The White House
pulled out all the stops to make sure a majority voted for partition.
Loy Henderson of
the State Department was horrified when he heard reports about the last-minute
change in the behavior of the U.S. delegates. They were ignoring the State
Department’s orders and were obviously following White House orders. Dave Niles
had a lot to do with it. He was a close advisor to the President. He called the
UN delegation and said that the President had instructed him to tell them that,
“by G-d, he wanted us to get busy and get all the votes that we possibly could.”
Eleanor Roosevelt was at the United Nations, and she went from delegation to
delegation telling them that she had been instructed by President Truman to
seek their support for partition.
Saved at the last
minute, the vote was two-thirds for partition: 33 for, 13 opposed, and 11
abstentions. This would not have happened had not both the United States and
the Soviet Union supported partition and advocated for it with their
constituencies.
The Villain: U.S. State Department
If only that were
the end, but it most assuredly was not. The State Department tried again to
sabotage the partition plan. They were of the opinion that Arab oil trumped
Jewish refugees and the Jewish vote in New York. The State and Defense
Departments openly undermined the President. Truman was taken by surprise when
he learned that State had put an embargo on sending arms to Palestine. Truman
was in a bind because Secretary of State Marshall was much more popular and
widely respected than he was, and he could not openly say that he had been
outsmarted by his own State Department.
State’s policy was
to do absolutely nothing to facilitate partition and, when it was obvious that
it could not succeed, it withdrew its support. Truman confided to his friend
Oscar R. Ewing that he still felt conflicted over Palestine. “The Jews are
bringing all kinds of pressure on me to support the partition of Palestine and
the establishment of a Jewish state. On the other hand, the State Department is
adamantly opposed. I have two Jewish assistants on my staff, Dave Niles and Max
Lowenthal. Whenever I try to talk to them about Palestine they burst into tears
because they are so emotionally involved.”
The State
Department played a dirty trick on the President. Marshall thought that partition
would mean war, thus it was wrong to allow it. He wanted the Security Council
to revisit partition and to approve trusteeship, then refer the matter back to
the General Assembly. The President was given a copy of such a statement, as
Marshall wanted, and Truman wrote on it, “For use if and when necessary.” In
other words, Truman did not want it made public unless the situation was dire
and partition impossible. He never intended it to be made public without his
prior approval.
But, of course,
the State Department did just that. They made it seem that the United States no
longer approved of partition. The State Department was openly in rebellion
against the President. They considered him an accidental president who had no
chance whatsoever of being elected again in 1948. They had no respect for him
and his views. The plan was now for the U.S. ambassador to the UN to announce
that the U.S. withdrew support for partition and supported trusteeship. The
speech was written and ready to go.
Enter Eddie Jacobson
Now, we come to
the hour of Eddie Jacobson. “Yesh koneh
olamo b’sha’ah achas.” The President couldn’t stand the Zionists like
Silver who pressured him too much. He was under a lot of strain, and maybe
didn’t realize that he was going to be betrayed by the State Department. He was
in awe of General Marshall. Only one person could get Truman to act, Chaim
Weizmann. He no longer held any position in the Zionist Movement, and his
health was not good, but Weizmann wrote asking for an appointment. The
secretary responded that the calendar was full, which meant that Truman would
not see Weizmann.
On February 20,
1948, Frank Goldman, Bnai Brith’s international president, called Eddie
Jacobson in the middle of the night and told him that Truman was refusing to
see any of the New York City politicians who had been imploring him to see
Weizmann. Truman was angry and washed his hands of the whole project because of
the strong criticism he had received for rejecting the idea of sending American
troops to fight the Arabs.
Jacobson couldn’t
get to Washington in time, so he sent a telegram: “I know that you have very
excellent reasons for not wanting to see Dr. Weizmann. But, as you once told
me, this gentleman is the greatest statesman and finest leader that my people
have. He is very old and heartbroken that
he could not get to see you.” Noting that he had not asked favors during all their
years of friendship, Jacobson continued, “I am now begging of you to see Dr.
Weizmann. I can assure you that I would not plead to you for any other of our
leaders.”
Truman immediately
answered. In short, he wrote, “I have concluded that the situation is not
solvable as presently set up; but I shall continue to get the solution outlined
in the United Nations resolution.” Then the President headed for Key West, the “Southern
White House.”
The Jewish Agency considered
the meeting crucial, and they asked Jacobson to come to Washington. On March
12, he took a flight from Kansas City, paying his own way as always. He had
spent so much of his money flying back and forth to Washington that he
apologized to his daughter Elinor, saying that he would have nothing left to
leave for his children. It cheered him up when she said the important thing he
was leaving them was his good name.
As always,
Jacobson did not make an appointment rather took his chances. The President was
glad to see his old friend. After some small talk about their families,
Jacobson brought up the issue of Palestine. Truman “immediately became tense,
abrupt in speech, and very bitter in the words he was throwing my way,” wrote
Jacobson. “In all our years of friendship, he had never talked to me that way.”
Truman mentioned
how mean and disrespectful certain Jewish leaders had been to him. “I suddenly
found myself thinking that my dear friend, the President of the United States,
was at that moment as close to being an anti-Semite as a man could possibly be.”
This is what Eddie
Jacobson said at that critical moment in Jewish history: “Harry, all your life
you have had a hero. You are probably the best-read man in America on the life
of Andrew Jackson. I remember when we had our store together and you were
always reading books on this great man.
“Well, Harry, I
have a hero too, who I think is the greatest Jew that ever lived. I am talking
about Chaim Weizmann. He is very sick, almost broken in health, but he has
traveled thousands of miles just to see you and plead the cause of my people.
You know that he had absolutely nothing to do with these insults, yet you
refuse to see him.
“Truman began to
drum his fingers. He looked me straight in the eyes and then said the most
endearing words I had ever heard from his lips: ‘You win, you baldheaded son of
a b… [That’s how Truman talked.] I will see him.’”
Weizmann got to
see Truman, and spoke in a totally different way than the Jewish leaders Truman
hated. He talked about the scientific work he and his associates were carrying
out in Rehovot and the need to prepare more land for future Jewish immigrants.
Truman told him, “My primary concern was to see justice done without bloodshed.”
Weizmann left the meeting believing that he had succeeded.
The very next day,
in the United Nations, the ambassador made a speech that the U.S. no longer
supported partition and wanted a trusteeship. Truman was flabbergasted. Truman asked
Clark Clifford, his trusted aide, “How could this have happened? I assured Dr.
Weizmann that we were for partition and would stick to it. He must think I’m a
plain liar.” Truman felt embarrassed and humiliated by his own State
Department. In May, he would deliver his own surprise.
Facts on the Ground
I will skip over
the attempts of the State Department to come up with a realistic plan to impose
trusteeship on Palestine. Their ideas were dismissed by both the Arabs and the
Jews. No one was willing to send troops to enforce a truce and impose a trusteeship.
It was impossible to accomplish. Trusteeship was an idea that was unworkable.
Meanwhile, on
April 1, the Haganah was finally getting arms from Czechoslovakia and launched
Project Nachshon to open the way to Jerusalem. Then there was the Deir Yassin
massacre which encouraged flight by many Arabs. The State Department, would not
give up. They were so against a Jewish state in Palestine and so biased towards
the Arabs’ oil that, in mid-April, they introduced a resolution in the UN for a
temporary trusteeship. It gained little support from anyone. The State
Department pressed Britain to change its mind and stay longer in Palestine, to
no effect. The State Department plan to derail partition was an embarrassing
failure for them.
On April 27, Eddie
Jacobson went to Washington again, just to see his old friend. He was relieved
to hear from Truman’s lips that he had assured Dr. Weizmann that he supported
partition. Jacobson also discussed the matter of recognizing the Jewish state
as soon as it was proclaimed. He was happy to report to Dr Weizmann, “To this
he agreed with a full heart.”
David Niles and
Max Lowenthal, Truman’s aides, had an ally in Clark Clifford. In a May 9 memo,
Lowenthal wrote a most powerful argument for partition and against trusteeship.
The Jews had, on their own, made partition a reality. Not only did they control
the Jewish part of Palestine militarily, they had maintained what was in effect
a government. He suggested that Truman announce that he would recognize Israel
as soon as it was declared.
Showdown in the Oval Office
Meanwhile, just a
few days before the British Mandate ended, there was a very tense meeting
between Secretary of State Marshall and Clark Clifford, who was tasked to
present the pro-partition arguments in front of President Truman.
On a “cloudless,
sweltering day,” the group met in the Oval Office. Truman “sat at his desk, his
famous ‘THE BUCK STOPS HERE’ plaque in front of him on the desk. On his left
sat Marshall, austere and grim, and his deputy Robert Lovett. To the right of Truman
sat Clark Clifford, David Niles, and the appointments secretary, Matthew
Connelly.
Although the
meeting began calmly enough, it soon turned “confrontational and hostile.” Secretary of State Marshall began by
responding to a report from Eretz Yisrael that the battles just prior to the
declaration of the state were going well for the Jews. Marshall felt that “it
was extremely dangerous to base long-term policy on temporary military
success.” He said that he had given the Jewish Agency representative notice at
an earlier meeting that that they were taking a gamble. “If the Jews got into
trouble and came running to us, there was no warrant to expect help from the
United States, which had warned them of the grave risk they were running.”
Next, it was Clifford’s
turn to speak. First, he announced his disagreement with State’s position.
State favored a trusteeship, which presupposed a single Palestine. “That,” said
Clifford, “is unrealistic. Partition into Jewish and Arab sections has already
happened. Jews and Arabs are already fighting each other from territory each
side presently controls. Third, Mr. President, I strongly urge you to give
prompt recognition to the Jewish State immediately upon the termination of the
British Mandate at midnight, May 14.”
Finally, Clifford
told the group that, since the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, “the
Jewish People the world over had been waiting for the promise of a homeland to
be fulfilled. There was no reason to wait a day longer. Taking words directly
from a speech that Senator Truman had given in 1943, he added, “There must be a
safe haven for these people, a land of their own would be one way of atoning
for the atrocities committed by the Nazis.” Countering the pro-Arab position of
the State Department, Clifford concluded by saying that it was important for
the United States national interest to have one friendly democracy in the
Middle East “on which we can rely.”
As Clifford was
speaking, he noticed that Marshall’s face was turning red. Marshall launched into
a furious, emotional attack on the positions taken by Clifford. “Mr. President,”
Marshall said, “I thought the meeting was to consider foreign policy. I don’t
even know why Clifford is here. He is a domestic policy advisor, and this is a
foreign policy matter.”
Truman answered
simply, “Well, General, he’s here because I asked him to be here.” To which
Marshall retorted, “He is pressing a political consideration with regard to
this issue. I don’t think politics should play any part in this.”
At this point,
Lovett added, “It would harm the President’s prestige, being a very transparent
attempt to win the Jewish vote.” Then Lovett brought out an intelligence report
that emanated from the British Foreign Office, which Clifford found ridiculous
on its face – that the Soviet Union was sending Jewish Communist agents into
Palestine. Clifford said that it was not true. In fact, Jewish Communists were
a small minority in the Yishuv, and
many of the Jews going to Palestine were from Eastern Europe and fleeing the Communists.
General Marshall, was a highly respected
military leader of World War II and much more popular than “accidental”
President Harry S. Truman. Marshall concluded his remarks with this statement: “If
the President were to follow Mr. Clifford’s advice and, if in the elections I
were to vote, I would vote against the President.”
There was utter
silence in the room. If Marshall’s statement were to become public, it could
“virtually seal the dissolution of the Truman Administration and send the
Western Alliance into disarray.” It would certainly ensure Truman’s defeat in
the upcoming presidential election.
Truman ended the
meeting quickly. He told Clifford, “I
still want to do it. But be careful. I can’t afford to lose General Marshall.”
The State Comes into Being
As I stated at the
beginning, every man has his hour. Now, maybe we can begin to understand what
President Truman was up against and how his recognition of Israel could have
left his political career in ruins. How would he act at the crucial moment, a
few days away? How would you act if you were Harry Truman?
On May 14 at 4
p.m. (erev Shabbat), the Jewish
Agency leaders, meeting in the Tel Aviv Art Museum, proclaimed the
establishment of the State of Israel as of midnight.
Eliyahu Elath, the
first ambassador of Israel, was advised by David Niles to write a letter to
Secretary Marshal, informing him officially that at one minute past six p.m.,
the Act of Independence would be declared and asking for recognition. That was
a technicality but necessary.
President Harry
Truman announced U.S. recognition at 6:11 p.m. on May 14, which was slightly
after midnight in time zone of the new State of Israel. Truman turned to one of
his aides and said, “The old
doctor will believe me now.”
In later writings,
Truman said that he saw this as part of his fight as president against those
who sought to thwart the executive’s right to make U.S. foreign policy. “No one
in any department can sabotage the President’s policy,” he wrote.
Truman Is Victorious
Although the arms embargo
was never officially lifted, Truman told J. Edgar Hoover, chief of the FBI, to
look the other way and let the Jews buy and ship arms from U.S. ports.
Truman now had to
run for election to another term. The Gallop Poll predicted that he would lose
to Thomas E. Dewey. He mounted a cross-country whistle-stop tour. Few believed
he could win, but Abe Feinberg made sure he had the money to go on. In an
unforeseen upset, Truman won. The moment is captured in the famous photo of a
triumphant Truman holding up that morning’s newspaper with the banner headline
reading, “Dewey Defeats Truman.” Now he was no longer an accidental president.
On May 17, Chaim
Weizmann was elected president of Israel, a symbolic post of honor. On May 24,
Truman received the new president at the White House. Weizmann presented Truman
with a Torah. Accepting it, Truman, quipped, “Thanks, I always wanted one.”
Later, Truman would say that the Torah was one of the greatest things he owned:
“It was very special because Weizmann needed to issue an injunction authorizing
a Baptist to handle it.”
In 1949, Chief
Rabbi Isaac Halevi Herzog visited Truman in the White House. Rav Herzog (who
Rav Ruderman told me was a gaon olam)
told Truman that “he had been given a task once fulfilled by the mighty king of
Persia and that he, too, like Cyrus, would occupy a place of honor in the
annals of the Jewish People.
The Palmach Museum
in Tel Aviv tells the story of the Palmach, many of whose commandoes did not
survive the fight for independence. On the wall, there is a quote from Chaim
Weizmann: “The world will not give the
Jews a state on a silver platter.” Chaim Weizmann was not a religious
man. Yet, when I visited the museum about him, it shows the book he was looking
at when he died. It was a Machzor
opened to “Unesaneh tokef.”
Days of Friendship
After Truman
returned to his home after his term in the White House, he and Jacobson were
often seen together in Kansas City. In 1955, they began planning a trip of a
lifetime. Truman was excited and wrote to Jacobson that they would leave by
ship from New York for England, where Truman would receive an honorary degree
from Oxford. Then they would visit Winston Churchill and the Queen. Next on the
itinerary was Holland, where they would meet the royal family, and then on to
Paris and Rome to have an audience with the Pope. Finally, Truman said they
would travel to Israel by ship, arriving at the port of Haifa. Eddie Jacobson
died of a heart attack a few months later. Truman called off the trip and never
went to Israel.
After Jacobson’s
death, Truman said, “I don’t think I have ever known a man that I thought more
of than Eddie Jacobson. He was an honorable man.… He was one of the finest men
that ever walked the earth. Eddie was one of those men you read about in the
Torah about two men Enoch and Noah. You will find that those descriptions will
fit Eddie Jacobson to the dot.” Truman paid a shiva call and told Eddie’s daughters, Gloria and Elinor, that
their father was the “closest thing to kinfolk that I had.”
I will leave you,
the reader, with a question. The State Department and the British viewed
Truman’s actions regarding the creation of Israel as the result of political
expediency. Would he have done it unless he thought it was in America’s
national interests to do so? What do you think?
The information in this article comes from A Safe Haven:
Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, by
Ronald Radosh (Harper Collins).
