Reviewed by Rabbi Mordechai Shuchatowitz, Head of the Baltimore Bais Din

It is well known that the Chofetz Chaim wrote sefarim about the prohibition of lashon hara for the sake of making his fellow Jews more aware and careful about speaking negatively about others. It is not as well known that the Chofetz Chaim wrote the sefer Ahavas Chesed to bring about awareness of other interpersonal halachos that pertain to relations between people. One such area of halacha that the Chofetz Chaim discusses pertains to paying workers on time. The term for this in Gemara is the prohibition of bal talin   – delaying the payment of wages. The purpose of this article is to discuss this mitzva and its practical applications. 

It should be noted that in his introductory remarks to this topic, the Chofetz Chaim mentions  that there are many religious Jews who are careful about other mitzvos but are lax about paying their workers. He continues that these people may justify their behavior by the fact that the amount owed is not that large, or they may have some other excuse. The Chofetz Chaim concludes that it is clear to him that this laxity comes from ignorance of these halachos, and that if these people were aware of the Torah imperative to pay in a timely fashion, they would certainly be much more careful.

Reviewed By Rabbi Mordechai Shuchatowitz, Head of The Baltimore Bais Din

In previous articles, we discussed the concept of ribbis, which is the paying of interest for a loan. We discussed that a loan is when either money or some other commodity, such as food, is given from a lender to a borrower in order to be spent or consumed by the borrower. If the principal of the loan amount is paid back, and the borrower adds something extra to the principal, that extra is prohibited because of ribbis.

In this article, I will discuss cases that are prohibited in halacha because of ribbis, even though there is no actual loan. These are cases in which a business transaction has taken place and some additional compensation is made for waiting to receive what was committed. This includes both prepayment for items purchased that won’t be received until some time later, as well as to post-payments for items bought on credit and paid for later on. Although such transactions are not an actual loan and do not therefore constitute ribbis d’Orayisah (from the Torah), they are nonetheless assur mid’rabbon (rabbinically prohibited) due to their similarity to ribbis. This is called “agar natar,” which means reward for waiting.

 Administrator, Baltimore Bais Din

Reviewed By Rabbi Mordechai Shuchatowitz, Head of the Baltimore Bais Din

In a previous article, we discussed some fundamentals of the prohibition of ribbis, interest. To summarize, ribbis is a prohibition that applies when someone takes a loan, and then returns the principal amount of the loan to the lender and adds on some extra as payment for the loan. We discussed that the most common case of ribbis is for a loan of money, where the borrower spends the money and then returns the principal amount with interest. However, the prohibition of ribbis applies to anything that is consumed. The most common example of this is lending food. For example, if the lender gave a loan of one pound of flour, and the borrower returned two pounds of flour, that would be a prohibition of ribbis. If the interest of the extra food was stipulated at the time of the loan, that would be prohibited by Torah law. This is called ribbis ketzutzah, stipulated ribbis. However, if the borrower returns more on his own because of the loan, this would be prohibited by rabbinic law, called ribbis me’ucheres, ribbis given by the borrower on his own, and is discussed in the Gemara Bava Metzia 75B.

Administrator, Baltimore Bais Din

Reviewed By Rabbi Mordechai Shuchatowitz, Head of the Baltimore Bais Din

As we approach Yom Kippur, we hope to spend our attention contemplating the theme of the day and how we can each better ourselves. One of the prominent aspects of the davening of Yom Kippur is the Viduy, when we admit to Hashem what we have done wrong throughout the year. Many of the wrongdoings mentioned in Viduy relate to different forms of improper speech.* While we often think of improper speech as being lashon hara or ona’as devarim (comments intended to hurt another), there is another, more subtle aspect to being careful with one’s speech: the obligation to keep one’s word and verbal commitment.

This subject is discussed in halacha, which gives direction as to when one must keep a verbal commitment.  Halacha views giving one’s word with seriousness. We will examine this topic through three situations that often come up in daily living.

Reviewed By Rabbi Mordechai Shuchatowitz, Head of the Baltimore Bais Din

In past articles[1], we explored various scenarios that arise relating to carpools and what guidance we can learn from the appropriate halachos. We will now explore a different scenario, that of bullying, and see how it impacts the obligation of a carpool group.

The unfortunate reality is that bullying exists among our children.[2] It is obvious that the optimal situation is where the bullying can be stopped. But the goal of this article is to explore one specific angle of this issue: When the bullying persists within a carpool setting, may the other carpool families expel the bully from the carpool? We will illustrate this situation through a fictitious case study.

Reviewed by Rabbi Mordechai Shuchatowitz, Head of the Baltimore Bais Din

Any member of the Baltimore kehilla who has school-aged children is well aware of the fact that there is no busing service for private school children. It is the responsibility of the parents to transport their children to and from the schools they attend. The most common method by far of getting one’s children to school is by forming a carpool with neighbors.

It is obvious that every parent has certain hopes: that